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REGIONAL INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THY NEIGHBOR'S CURSE 
ALBERTO ADES and HAK B. CHUA 
OCTOBER 1993 
Abstract 
We show that regional instability, defined as political instability in neighboring countries, has 
strong negative effects on a country's income per capita growth rate. The magnitude of this negative 
externality is found to be equivalent to the effect from an identical increase in domestic political 
instability. We find that there are three main channels in which regional instability hurt growth. First, 
regional. instability disrupts trade flows. The shares of merchandise and manufactured trade are 
substantially lower in countries with high regional instability. Second, regional instability require 
increases in military outlays at the expense of other productive activities. Third, the composition of 
investment is found to be skewed against the share of equipment investment in countries. with high 
regional instability. To the extent that equipment investment has a higher social rate of return than 
transport or structure investment, this shift can reduce aggregate returns to capital and hamper growth. 
KEYWORDS: Political Instability, Growth, Spillovers, Externality, Development, Spatial Correlation. 
I. Introduction: Thy Neighbor's Curse 
There has been extensive theoretical and empirical work recently investigating the links between 
domestic political instability and economic growth.1 There seems to be a general agreement that domestic 
political instability is negatively correlated with growth in per capita income, but the direction of causality 
is still a matter of debate. In a separate line of inquiry, Chua (1993) has provided empirical support for 
the proposition that a country's growth rate depends not only on domestic investment but also on the 
investment of its neighboring countries. These are taken as evidence in support of regional spillovers from 
human and physical capital. These measurable regional economic variables can account for the existence 
of spatial correlation in economic performance between countries located in common geographical 
regions. This paper essentially integrates both these lines of research. We argue and show that regional 
instability in neighboring countries has strong negative effects on economic growth. 
An example is offered by Malawi during the early 1980s. Being a landlocked country in Africa, 
Malawi began facing external transportation problems as civil unrest in neighboring Mozambique became 
worse. By the mid-1980s, the main external trading routes through Mozambique were fully closed. 
Shipping had to be rechanneled through Durban in South Africa, which was three to four times the 
distance of Malawi's earlier trading routes. Already weakened by a persistent drought, the Malawian 
economy also had to deal with an influx of refugees from Mozambique, and a worsening security 
situation along the borders and external transport routes.2 
Rwanda and Tanzania have both been affected by the political turmoil in neighboring Uganda. 
Tanzania and Uganda have been engaged in a war from the second half of the 1970s until about 1986. 
The war had destroyed much of the transport networks, depleted much of the vehicle fleet, and spoiled 
1 Some recent work relating political instability and economic growth include Alesina, Roubini, Ozier and 
Swagel (1992), Alesina and Perotti (1993), Londregan and Poole (1991), Helliwell (1991), and Barro (1991). 
2 World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies 1992, pgs. 322-326. 
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the once-productive agricultural lands in Uganda. Rwanda, a small landlocked country located in a 
squeeze between Uganda and Tanzania, was invaded by Rwandese Tutsi refugees coming from Uganda. 
The government of Rwanda was able to repel the invasion but sporadic fighting continues along the 
border. The transportation, trade, and tourism sectors in Rwanda were severely affected. On the fiscal 
front, the military situation necessisated a substantial increase in security-related outlays, as reflected by 
the surge in imports ofmilitary equipment and corresponding decreases in capital outlays in.the national 
accounts.3 
Political instability in Uganda and Tanzania have also spread to landlocked Burundi. 
Transportation costs from Burundi to the nearest Indian Ocean ports of Mombasa in Kenya and Dar Es 
Salaam in Tanzania remain high. Passage through these neighboring countries have not been reliable, 
where occasional disputes have caused serious domestic shortages and disruptions in trade flows.4 
The Gulf Crisis in the Middle East between August 1990 and February 1991 offers yet another 
case of how regional political shocks affect neighboring countries not directly involved in the conflict. 
The best example is provided by Jordan, which lost export markets in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 
and remittances from Jordanian workers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Returning Jordanian workers 
required higher expenditures for education and health, worsening the fiscal deficit. Tourism and transport 
sector income fell. Gross domestic product declined by about0.6 percent in 1990, a sharp reversal to the 
8 percent growth rate projected before the dawn of the crisis.5 
There are however cases in which countries may benefit from political unrest in neighboring 
countries. If neighbors compete for a scarce pool of foreign capital or aid, political instability in the rival 
3 World Bank (1992), pgs 465-470, 506-511, 542-548. 
4 World Bank (1992), pgs 79-85. 
5 World Bank (1992), pgs 286-91. 
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country can lead to a larger share of that pool. 6 If neighbors are competing oligopolists of a good or 
resource, production disruptions in a rival country can lead to an improvement in the terms of trade as 
well as an increased share of the export market. • Neighboring countries may also benefit from the huge 
capital flight and the migration of talented people that often occur in countries with political turmoil. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s for example, Brazil received a continuous flow of Argentine scientists as 
a consequence of a crackdown on political opposition imposed by the Argentine military regime. The 
current brain drain from Yugoslavia in the midst of the current political instability and the hardships 
imposed by global economic sanctions offer yet another case in which countries may actually benefit from 
unrest in another country. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a brief description of the data set and 
summary statistics. Section m lays out the basic cross-country regressions relating regional instability and 
economic growth. Section N describes the three main channels in which political instability in 
neighboring countries reduce economic growth. Section A examines the impact of regional instability on 
trade flows. Section B examines the impact of regional instability on defense spending. Section C 
examines the impact of regional instability on the size and composition of investment. Section V discusses 
some implications for future growth. Section VI concludes. 
6 Ifhowever foreign investors view the bad shock in one country as a signal for the whole region, then countries 
in the whole region might well lose out on foreign capital or aid. 
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Map 2: Political Instability in Latin America 
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II. An Index of Regional Instability 
Our main variables come from the data set constructed by Barro and Wolf (1989). The means 
and standard deviations of the variables, and a list of the countries can be found in the Appendices in 
Barro (1991). We also use disaggregated investment figures constructed by De Long and Summers 
(1991), and trade measures constructed by Levine and Renelt (1992). The full data set covers 118 
countries over the sample period 1960 to 1985.7 Due to many missing variables however, we confine 
the empirical analysis to a sample of 98 countries, the same large sample used in Barro (1991). Barro 
(1991) uses the number of revolutions and coups per year averaged over 1960 to 1985 (or subsample) 
as an index of political instability. Th.is variable, abbreviated as REV, is intrepreted as an adverse 
influence on property rights, which therefore affects investment and economic growth negatively. We 
construct from this revolution variables several indexes of regional political instability. Our main variable 
is constructed by averaging the number of revolutions and coups per year for all the other countries in 
the defined region. A country's relevant region is defined to be its neighboring countries. The formula 
we use is simply 
L.. - 1 n 
REG REV = - ~n'7' REV, I 
where n is the number of neighboring countries bordering the respective country, and REV; is the number 
of revolutions and coups per year for country i from 1960 to 1985 or subsample. We also constructed 
various other indices of regional instability: the sum of REV, the maximum of the REV, and the 
minumum of the REV in neighboring countries.• 
We also construct an index of regional instability using the Social and Political Index (SPI) 
constructed by Alesina and Perotti (1993), where the index is generated from a formula suggested by 
7 There are however missing values for some of the countries. Barro (1991) uses 98 countries for his large 
sample and 76 countries for the small sample in his comprehensive cross-section study. 
6 
Gupta (1990). The SPI index appears to be quite reasonable and consistent as a measure of socio-political 
instability. The construction of this index accounts for the the number of political demonstrations against 
a government, the number of riots, the number of political strikes, the number of people killed in 
conjunction with any domestic political violence, the number of politically motivated assassinations, the 
number of politically motivated executions, the number of successful and unsuccessful coups, and the 
democracatic nature of the government. The . SPI index .is averaged across the sample.period 1960 to. 
1985. We construct our regional instability index similarly by averaging the SPI index over the sample 
of neighboring countries in the region. 
The classification used for region is that of bordering countries as in Chua (1993). Such a 
definition prevents any subjective selectivity on what countries a certain region should include. A problem 
with this is the treatment of island countries, such as Japan and Madagascar, which do not have, strictly 
speaking, bordering neighbors. For island countries, the nearest neighboring countries which lie across 
straits, channels, or small bodies of water are used the relevant region. The relevant regions for each 
country under this classification are summarised in the Appendix. 
Our theory of regions in this analysis focuses on geographical proximity. Regions of course can 
be defined in other dimensions. Potential candidiates include culture, language, colonial linkages, a 
customs union or even a common currency area. Certainly there are many historical examples where 
political instability in certain countries have extended far beyond the involvement of just its neighboring 
countries. Civil war in Angola in the mid-1970s for example led to the expulsion of about half-a-million 
of Portugese settlers. The United States is currently receiving an influx of refugees not just from 
neighboring Haiti, but from China. We agree that the effects of political instability might extend far 
beyond geographical boundaries, but nevertheless we believe these negative spillovers are most 
pronounced in neighboring countries. Other intrepretations of a region are open for future work. 
Tables 1 provides some summary statistics of the indices of domestic and regional political 
7 
instability. Table 2 provides a correlation matrix which relates some major economic indicators and the 
political instability indices. Tables 3 and 4 describes some of the countries with high domestic political 
instability and high regional instability. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Max Min 
REV 0.217 0.253 1.150 0.000 
REG REV AVG 0.235 0.183 0.783 0.000 
REG REV SUM 0.782 0.845 3.310 0.000 
REG REV MAX 0.419 0.359 1.150 0.000 
REG REV MIN 0.122 0.140 0.555 0.000 
Note: REV is the number of revolutions and coups per year averaged over the period 1960 to 1985. The 
AVG, SUM, MAX and MIN correspond to the average, sum, maximum, and minimum of the REV 
variable in neighboring countries. 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
GR6085 GDP60 PRIM60 INV REV REG REV 
GR6085 1.00 
GDP60 0.09 1.00 
PRIM60 0.46 0.65 1.0 
INV 0.52 0.52 0.66 1.0 
REV -0.38 -0.37 -0.37 -0.45 1.0 
REG REV -0.35 -0.50 -0.47 -0.30 0.27 1.0 
8 
Table 3: Countries Ranked in terms of Domestic Instability and Regional Instability 





















Highest REGREV Index 
Chile (Bol,Arg) 0.78 
Paraguay (Bol,Arg) 0.73 
Swaziland (Moz) 0.52 
Uruguay (Arg) 0.52 
Madagascar (Moz) 0.50 
Turkey (lraq,Syria) 0.50 
Togo (Benin,Ghana) 0.50 
CAR (Sud, Chad,Zaire) 0.49 
Kenya (Sud,Ethi, U gan) 0.49 
Zambia (Moz,Ang,Zaire) 0.48 
Note: Countries in parentheses represent neighboring countries with high political instability. 
Table 4: Countries Ranked in terms of Difference between Domestic and Regional Instability 
Low Domestic Instability 





Kenya (Sud,Ethi,U gand) 
Cyprus (Turk,Syr) 














High Domestic Instability 
Low Regional Instability 
Mozam (S.Afr,Malawi,Zamb) -0.89 
Bolivia (Parag,Braz) -0.83 
Argentina (Urug,Parag) -0.61 
Iraq (Kuwait,Saudi) -0.50 
Syria (lsrael,Jordan) -0.48 
Surinam (Guyana,Brazil) -0.42 
Ecuador (Colombia) -0.41 
Korea (Japan) -0.40 
Ethiopia (Kenya) -0.38 
Tanz (Malawi,Kenya,Zamb) -0.36 
Note: The index is constructed by simply calculating the difference between the regional instability index 
REGREV and the domestic instability index REV. Countries in parentheses represent the influential 
neighboring countries. 
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m. Regional Instability and Economic Growth 
Table 2 reports the correlation of several standard variables usually included in a growth 
regression with an index of regional instability. What is perhaps most striking is the low correlation 
between the index of domestic instability and the index of regional instability. This suggests that the index 
of regional instability can provide much more information not captured previously by the domestic 
instability variable. This low correlation between the two indices are highlighted in·Figure 1. This low 
correlation also suggest that the regional instability variable can probably be treated as an exogenous 
variable or shock, rather than as some consequence of a domino-effect arising from the spread ofpolitical 
instability from one country to another. The exogenous nature of this variable justifies putting it on the 
right-hand side of a regression with little argument about causality. This advantage stands in contrast with 
the endogeneity problems plaguing the intrepretation ofthe negative correlation between domestic political 
instability and economic growth, where Alesina and Perotti (1993) for example attempt to disentangle. 
Table 5 summarises the importance of regional instability as a predictor of economic growth in 
a cross-section growth regression with the standard benchmark variables as in Barro (1991). Column 1 
reports the benchmark regression with the index of domestic political instability included (REV). Column 
2 includes the index of regional instability in the regression. The coefficient on the index of regional 
instability (REG REV) is about -0.028 (s.e. = 0.008), indicating that an increase in the average number 
of revolutions and coups in neighboring countries by one over a decade reduces per capita annual income 
growth by 0.28 percent. This index of regional instability remains significant even when the index of 
domestic instability and continent dummies are controlled for. Another interesting result is the fact that 
the addition of the regional instability index REGREV does not have a dramatic effect on the magnitude 
of the coefficient on the domestic instability index REV. This is consistent with the observed low 
correlation between the index of domestic and regional instability, suggesting that the regional instability 
index adds new information not previously captured by the domestic instability index. Column 3 reports 
10 
a weighted regressions in which the observations are weighted in accordance with the levels of GDP per 
capita. Similar results are found to hold. 8 Column 4 reports the regrssion where the standard errors for 
the coefficients are based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix, since 
heteroskedasticity could be important across countries. As shown, the standard errors do not differ 
significantly, however, from those obtained by ordinary least squares. Column (5) shows that similar 
results hold for just bordering countries, that is the sample excluding island countries~ Columns (6), (7) 
and (8) introduces continent dummies and other regional variables suggested by Chua (1993). The 
coefficient on the index of regional instability, though falling in size, remains negative and significant. 
Figures 2 and 3 plot the relationship between domestic instability and growth, and regional 
instability and growth respectively. The adverse effect of regional instability on growth is just as apparent 
from the plot, where the negative relationship is not simply driven by a few outliars. 
Table 6 includes other measures of regional instability in the standard growth regression. The 
results show that political instability in neighboring countries are an important factor and are robust to 
the use of different formulas. The coefficients on the sum, maximum, and minimum number of 
revolutions and coups in neighboring countries are all negative and significant. If we take the increase 
in the adjusted R2 as an indicator of the explanatory power of these variables, then ranked in the order 
of importance is the average (0.06), the maximum (0.04), the sum (0.03), and lastly, the minimum 
(0.02), where the number is brackets shows the increase in the adjusted R2 when the variable is included 
in the benchmark regression. We use the average measure for the remainder of our empirical analysis 
since this variable seems to have the most explanatory power. The mean of this variable is about the same 
as the index of domestic political instability. Comparing the relative coefficients on the regional and• 
domestic instability index therefore provides a quick guide to the relative effects. 
Column 4 in Table 6 reports the regression results using the social-political index constructed by 
8 Weighting the observations by land area produces similar results. 
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Alesina and Perotti (1993) as an index of political instability. The regional SPI index is also significant 
and negative, demonstrating that the main argument of this paper is not sensitive to the measuments used 
for domestic instability. 9 
9 We also construct an index of regional instability using the average number ofmilitary casualties per year over 
the period 1960 to 1985 as the index of political stabillity (Easterly, Pritchet, Summers and Kremer (1993)). The 
regional instability index is negative and significant in the standard growth regression shown, but loses its 
significance when continent dummies are introduced. This variable performs more poorly than the other indices 
simply because it is more crude and there are a large number of zeros for many of the countries. 
12 
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Figure 3: Regional Instability and Economic Growth 
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IV. Channels in which Regional Instability Lower Growth 
Section I showed the robust negative influence of regional instability on economic growth. This 
section pins down the channels in which political instability in neighboring countries block income 
growth. Several natural explanations are examined using cross-section data. The first hypothesis is the 
potential disruption regional instability can have on international trade flows. The second hypothesis is 
the impact regional instability has on forcingincreases in domestic military expenditures. The redirection 
of resources towards defense and border security comes at the expense of otherwise more productive 
activities. The third hypothesis is the possible adverse effect regional instability has on domestic 
investment. 
A. Regional Instability and Trade 
Political instability in neighboring countries can block external trading routes and destroy 
transport networks. Passage through transit routes become unreliable, especially in situations where 
governments have lost control and lawlessness prevail. Such disruptions are especially acute for 
landlocked countries, which rely on transit routes through neighboring countries for coastal access. This 
was the case for Malawi when civil unrest broke out in neighboring Mozambique, forcing shipping routes 
to be rechanneled through Durban in South Africa. Landlocked Burundi faced high transports costs and 
unreliable passage through Tanzania in the midst of its political instability. 
Another illuminating case is that of Slovenia, one of the former republics of Yugoslavia, when 
its neighbors were engaged in the Croatian War during the second half of 1992. Slovenia, although 
abstaining from the war, suffered a 15 percent drop in GNP between the outbreak of hostilities and the 
end of the year. Trade with the rest of Yugoslavia collapsed, falling by 32 percent during the same 
period. 10 
lO The Economist Intelligence Unit (1992), EIU Country Report No.l, pg 26. 
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Disruptions to the normal channels of trade can have severe effects on growth. First and foremost 
is the shortage of food and basic necessities such as the sources of energy, which can potentially paralyze 
the whole economy. Such was the case in Armenia, when fighting in Georgia cut off its energy supplies 
from Russia, forcing the closure of 85 percent of Armenian enterprises in the winter of 1991. To the 
extent that these basic necessities fit the minimal input levels required for example by Leontief-type 
production functions, severe shortages in one such necessity can cause a severe disruption to the whole · 
production process. 
Second, shortages of intermediate inputs in the midst of these trade disruptions are also likely to 
force a consolidation of production to simpler processes involving less specialization and abundant input 
substitutes. This kind of consolidation is natural if one considers a multiplicative O-Ring production 
function which Kremer (1993) proposes. Bottlenecks and trade restrictions become quantitatively 
important with an O-ring production function. Uncertainties over input supplies would force firms to 
choose technologies with simpler and smaller number of tasks. 
Third, longer phases of regional instability can also mean a severe disruption in communication 
channels with the rest of the world in the face of higher transport costs and unreliable communication 
links. To the extent that growth depends on the facilitation and exchange between entrepreneurs in 
different countries, regional instability can hamper the diffusion process of such knowledge transfers. 
We examine the potential negative influence regional instability has on trade by examining cross­
section data on merchandise and manufactured trade shares. Tables 7 and 8 report the regressions where 
the merchandise and manufactured trade shares are regressed on domestic and regional instability, and 
other control variables. Both the domestic and regional political indices enter negatively and significantly. 
What is more striking is that the coefficient on the regional instability variable REGREV is about one and 
a half times larger than the coefficient on the domestic instability variable REV. Controlling for 
population and land area as in Pritchett (1991) do not change the significance of this result. Including 
16 
continent dummies likewise do not alter the coefficient or its significance noticeably. This coefficient 
•. indicates that a rise in the average .number of revolutions and coups by one in the region over a decade­
(an increase in REGREV by 0.1) reduces the share of merchandise trade by about 6 percentage points.• 
In comparison, a rise in the domestic number of revolutions and coups by one over a decade reduces the 
share of merchandise trade by about 3.8 percentage points. 
We also include a landlock dummy and an interaction term between regional instability and a · 
landlock dummy to see whether countries located away from the ocean are penalised as a result of their 
geography. 11 These variables enter insignificantly and show very little support for the argument that 
landlocked countries do any worse. The rather impressive economic performances of the landlocked 
African countries Bostwana and Lesotho for example is consistent with this result. One could of course 
argue that the geographical handicap of these two countries is partially compensated by the fact that both 
are located next to South Africa, as Chua (1993) noted, a relatively stable country with good 
infrastructure. 
B. Regional Instability and Defense Spending 
We investigate in this section the impact regional instability has on defense spending. Regional 
crisis often force a substantial increase in military outlays to prevent the fighting from spreading across 
political boundaries and avoid the usual avalanche of refugees that comes with wars. The most obvious 
example is the Middle East, where countries like Israel, Iran, Jordan and Syria devote more than 7 
percent of GDP to defense. During the late 1970s, the government of Rwanda likewise raised security 
outlays when fighting between Uganda and Tanzania threaten to spread across the borders and refugees 
began invading from Uganda. The hostility between North and South Korea have translated into an 
11 The landlocked countries in our sample include Bostwana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Paraguay, Nepal, Austria, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland. 
17 
ongoing game of accumulation of firepower. 
The empirical literature relating military expenditure to economic growth have however produced 
no conclusive relationship. The earlier work include Benoit (1978) who actually found that countries with· 
a heavy defense burden generally had the most rapid growth rates. Numerous studies have been 
undertaken since then mainly using cross-country data, but there seems no consensus on the impact of 
defense spending on economic performance. We likewise find that the,GDP share of defense spending ; 
enters insignificantly in the standard growth regression. Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1993) more 
recently however combine cross-section with time-series data and show that military spending has a 
significant negative effect on growth. They argue that military expenditures not only crowd out private 
investment, but also "creates external diseconomies and misallocation of resources which affect the 
growth performance of the economy." 
Our view of the matter is that some portion of defense expenditure are necessary for the 
protection of national property rights as Thompson (1974) argues. However, to the extent that geography 
and adverse external threats forces far greater outlays beyond normal levels, resources must be redirected 
from other productive activities. Such spending may be necessary and wise in the face of such shocks, 
but are likely to have adverse effects on investment and growth. We show in this section that regional 
instability has a strong positive influence on military spending,.. even after controlling for the share of 
military spending by neighboring countries. 
Table 9 summarises the main empirical results linking defense spending to political 
instability. 12 First, domestic political instability does not have a significant effect on defense spending. 
Second, regional instability has a strong positive impact on defense spending. These results indicate that 
military outlays respond to outside rather than inside influences. Third, domestic defense spending of a 
12 Other variables such as the GDP in 1960, population, share of government consumption, indexes of civil 
liberty, and other Barro-type variables do not enter significantly and are therefore excluded from the regression. 
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country is strongly correlated with the defense spending of neighboring countries. Aggresive countries 
devoting large resources to military buildup are likely to force a natural likewise response among its -
neighbors, a reaction necessary to deter potential future military attacks. Examples of this 11ratchetting 
effect" include the Middle East countries, North and South Korea, and South Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, even after controlling for this effect, regional instability still has a significant positive 
impact on defense spending. That is, crisis in- neighboring countries :such as coups which are not 
deliberate acts of- aggression, has· a -strong and positive impact on domestic defense spending. The 
magnitude of the coefficient suggest that an increase in the numbers of revolutions and coups by one over 
a decade in neighboring countries increase the GDP share of defense spending by 0.36 percentage points. 
Columns (3) -and (4) -in Table 9 report the regression results where instead the maximum is used as a 
proxy for regional instability and as the measure of regional military spending. The results are similar, 
where the coefficient on the maximum is positive and significant. 
C. Regional Instability and Investment 
A natural channel by which regional instability can reduce growth is through a fall in investment. 
We examine this hypothesis by examining cross-country-investment rates over the period 1960-85. The 
.. main result is-summarised in Table 10. There seems to be no significant·correlation between investment 
and political instability in neighboring countries. We find this result to be rather surprising, but using 
other variants of measures of regional instability do not alter this conclusion. 
We focus instead on possible changes in the composition of investment that might occur because 
of regional instability. Political instability in neighboring countries might prompt larger layouts on 
transport investment for example, as existing transit routes become unreliable and new transport links 
have to be constructed. Such shifts might crowd out other productive forms of investment. We use the 
disaggregated cross-section data constructed by De Long and Summers (1992) to investigate this 
19 
hypothesis. The share of equipment investment.is found to be significantly lower in countries with high 
regional instability. The shares of transport and structure investment do · not seem to be affected by 
regional instability. To the extent that one agrees with the conclusion reached by De Long and Summers 
(1992) on the strong social returns to equipment investment, a reduction in the share of equipment 
investment caused by regional instability is likely to hamper growth.13 
V. Some Implications for Future Growth 
We discuss in this section some implications for the economic growth of certain countries given 
the above empirical results. 
Our main conclusion is that geography and the political stability of your neighbors matter. The 
geographical distribution of the new Commonwealth of Independent States is likely to produce future 
sources of conflict between neighboring republics. Ten of the fourteen newly formed republics are 
landlocked and have no direct access to the sea or ocean. 14 In the old regime where most trade was 
intra-regional trade (that is, trade between states belonging to the same country, the USSR), there are less 
disputes over transportation rights across neighboring states. In the new regime where each regime 
behaves autonomously, and where inter-regional trade (trade with the rest of the world) becomes· 
.. > increasing}y important,. future transit rights will become a source of friction between neighboring states; 
Given the interconnectedness of the transportation networks in these new republics, potential political 
turmoil in one state will cause disruptions in trade flows among all adjoining states. 
The recent case of Armenia is revealing. Tense relations with Azerbaijan have cut Armenia off 
13 De Long and Summers argue that the social rate of return on equipment investment is on the order of 30
percent. 
14 These ten landlocked CIS republics are Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Kaz.akhstan,
Kyrgystan, Moldavia, Tadzhikistant, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Estonia, Lituania, Latvia have access to the
Baltic Sea. Russia has access to the Sea of Okhotsk. 
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from its supplies of basic foodstuffs, sources of energy and raw materials for its industries. On top of 
that; turmoil in neighboring state Georgia, especially the eruption of fighting· in the region ofAbkhazia;,, 
cut off most of the last remaining links to Russia. This sparked an energy crisis and the closure of 85 
percent of Armenian enterprises in the winter of 1991-92. 15 
CIS states that have coastal access such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia will have some 
geographical advantage. States like Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia, given their proximity to .. 
·the Middle East countries, are likelyto be affected·by any future political turmoil in that region. Picking. 
a winner is a difficult task, as Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1992), have noted from 
projections made in the past by credible economists. Nevertheless, we put our bet on the Eastern region 
of Russia, which is located next to the Pacific Ocean and is geographically located next to some rich and 
politically stable neighbors such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Substantial flows of both investment and 
knowledge are likely to cross over between these Asian countries and the eastern region of Russia with 
much more ease. 
Our results also suggest thatcountries located where there are large potential territorial disputes 
are likely to grow much more slowly. Territorial disputes remain a major source of friction among many 
countries, including the industrialised economies, even today. Table 11 provides statistics which describe 
·the average number of territorial disputes countries within a region are currently facing. Some interesting 
observations can be made. First, East Asian countries actually have the largest number of other countries 
with which there are disputes. That is, an East Asian country currently has on average at least one dispute 
with 2.6 other countries. This rather high number however is driven mainly by the dispute over the 
Spratley Islands which involves China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Other claims 
are rather minor in nature, such as the dispute over the Liancourt Rocks between South Korea and Japan, 
and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands between China, Japan, and Taiwan. In terms of boundary 
15 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1992), EIU Country Report No.4. 
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disputes, the number for East Asia drops to only 0.33. 
The second observation that can be made is that an European country has on average at least one 
dispute with 1.7 other countries, which appears relatively high. Most of these territorial disputes are. 
however over maritime claims, concentrated especially among the northern European countries: 0Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Excluding these maritime disputes, the average 
number of other countries with which there is at least one dispute drops to 0.76. 
Third, the number of border disputes are highest for Sub-Saharan African and South Asian 
countries, where a country in Africa or South Asia has at least one border dispute with at least 1.3 other 
neighboring countries. The proposed measure below however understates the degree from the costs of 
conflict, since many of these border disputes in Africa and the Middle East involves armed conflict and 
sporadic fighting while the border disputes in Europe and Latin America are less violent in nature. These 
territorial disputes over political boundaries are likely to produce future areas of conflict and will have 
an adverse effect on the economic growth of many developing countries located in these region. 
Table 11: Territorial Disputes with Other Countries 
Region Territorial Disputes Border & Maritime Border Disputes 
Disputes 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.38 1.35 1.25 
South Asia 1.25 1.21 0.96 
Latin America 1.25 1.21 0.96 
Europe 1.71 1.43 0.76 
East Asia 2.56 0.33 0.33 
Note: These numbers represent the average number of other countries with which the country concerned 
has at least one dispute. These average number of disputes are averaged across the sample of countries 
for the defined region. Border disputes are the number of bordering countries with which the country has 
a dispute with. Border & maritime disputes extends this to include disputes over maritime claims. 
Territoral disputes extends to all disputes including those with non-bordering countries. There are 40 
countries in the African sample, 24 in the Latin American sample, 21 in the Europe sample, 9 in the East 
Asia sample, and 4 in the South Asia sample. 
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VI. Conclusion 
We argue and show that political instability in neighboring countries has a strong adverse effect 
on economic growth. This effect is shownto be quantitatively important, where the impact on growth 
is roughly equal to an equivalent increase in the index of domestic instability. Our regional· instability 
index indicates that an increase in the number of revolutions and coups in neighboring countries by one· 
over a decade reduces average per capita income growth by about 0.28 percentage points. The.empirical i 
· · ·results are robust to various measures of constructing the regional instability index, and are robust to 
other measures of domestic instability, such as the socio-political index constructed by Alesina and Perotti 
(1993). 
We find that there are three main channels in which regional instability affects growth. First, 
regional instability disrupts trade flows. We show that the shares of merchandise and manufactures trade 
in countries with high regional instability are substantially lower. Second, regional instability forces 
substantial increases in military outlays, which draws resources from other productive activities. Third, 
regional instability does not affect the GDP share of total investment. Rather, the composition of 
investment is found to be skewed against equipment investment in countries with high regional instability. 
To the extent thatthere are large social returns to equipment investment as De Long and Summers (1992) 
argue, this shift from equipment towards machinery and transport investment is likely to reduce economic 
growth. 
We believe that the results presented provide strong evidence of negative spillovers from 
politically unstable neighbors. These adverse regional influences must be taken into account when 
projecting the future economic performance of countries. The evidence presented also suggest that the 
gains from reducing regional instability extends far beyond the welfare of the parties directly involved 
in a conflict. Policies directed at settling current territorial disputes in a peaceful and orderly fashion will 
provide a necessary step towards preventing adverse future shocks. We hope, that perhaps in our lifetime, 
23 
there will come a time when geography really doesn't matter any more for economic growth. 
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Table 5: Regional Instability and Economic Growth 












Note: Standard errors 
OLS OLS Weighted White-Correct 
GDP60 
98 98 98 98 
0.0318 0.0402 0.0424 0.0402 
(0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0072) 
-0.0072 -0.0081 -0.0071 -0.0081 
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
0.0288 0.0250 0.0237 0.0250 
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0067) (0.0092) 
0.0234 0.0230 0.0182 0.0230 
(0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0059) 
-0.0136 -0.0139 -0.0212 -0.0139 
(0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0047) 
-0.1272 -0.1207 -0.1158 -0.1207 
(0.0283) (0.0268) (0.0229) (0.0284) 
-0.0229 -0.0208 -0.0207 -0.0208 
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0057) 
-0.0280 -0.0257 -0.0280 
(0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0081) 
0.50 0.56 0.54 0.56 
0.0131 0.0123 0.0125 0.0123 
are in parentheses. The regression in column (3) are based on observations 
weighted with the levels of per capita GDP. Standard errors for the regression in column (4) are based 
on White's (1980) hetereoskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. 
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Table 5: Regional Instability and Economic Growth (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP Per Capita 1960-85 
Border 
Sample 
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 

















































































Adjusted R2 0.56 0.64 0.61 0.65 
s.e.e. 0.0115 0.0112 0.0116 0.0109 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Regional investment (REG INV) is the average investment rate 
from 1960-85 in neighboring countries. Regional schooling (REG SEC60) is the initial schooling rate in 
1960 averaged across the neighboring countries. 
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Table 6: Other Indexes of Regional Instability 
··· Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP 1960-85 
Observations 98 98 98 98 
CONST 0.0353 0.0374 0.0365 0.0748 
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0176) 
GDP1960 -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.0079 -0.0070 
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
SEC1960 0.0237 0.0224 0.0311 0.0223 
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0148) 
PRIM1960 0.0229 0.0240 0.0226 0.0087 
(0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0092) 
PPIDEV -0.0115 -0.0142 -0.0143 -0.0246 
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0065) 
GOVCONSMP -0.1180 -0.1222 -0.1286 -0.0924 
(0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0357) 
REVOL -0.0202 -0.0189 -0.0238 
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) 
SUM REG REVOL -0.0047 
(0.0018) 
MAX REG REVOL -0.0125 
(0.0041) 
MIN REG REVOL -0.0224 
(0.0099) 
SPI INDEX -0.0086 
(0.0042) 
A VG REG SPI INDEX -0.0102 
(0.0052) 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.45 
s.e.e. 0.0127 0.0125 0.0128 0.0115 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The SUM, MAX, and MIN corresponds to the sum, maximum, 
and minimum of the average number of revolutions and coups over the period 1960-85 in the sample of 
neighboring countries. 
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Table 7: Regional Instability and Merchandise Trade 





























































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Other variables such as government consumption and ppi60dev 
are found to be insignificant. 
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Table 8: Regional Instability and Manafactured Trade 





























































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Other variables such as government consumption and ppi60dev 
are found to be insignificant. 
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Table 9: Regional Instability and Defense Spending 
, Dependent Variable: Average Defense Expenditures to GDP 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
CONST 0.0235 0.0016 0.0253 0.0074 
(0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
SEC1960 0.0147 0.0317 0.0113 0.0254 
(0.0211) (0.0187) (0.0202) (0.0185) 
LAT AMER DUMMY -0.0285 -0.0099 -0.0321 -0.0151 
(0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0089) 
AFRICA DUMMY -0.0153 0.0004 -0.0203 -0.0067 
(0.0097) (0.0089) (0.0097) (0.0093) 
REVOL -0.0045 0.0033 -0.0008 -0.0004 
(0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0153) (0.0139) 
REGREVOL 0.0616 0.0356 
(0.0211) (0.0190) 
A VG REG DEFENSE 0.4651 
(0.0833) 
MAX REG REVOL 0.0400 0.0208 
(0.0108) (0.0105) 
MAX REG DEFENSE 0.3329 
(0.0706) 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.31 0.14 0.29 
s.e.e. 0.0327 0.0285 0.0319 0.0288 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Regional Instability and Investment 
,T)ependent Variable: Average Investment Share to GDP 1960-85 












































































Adjusted R2 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.28 
s.e.e. 0.0551 0.0227 0.0472 0.0080 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Residual investment share is the remaining share of total 
investment after subtracting the share of the dependent variable. 
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31. Sierra Leonne 
32. Somalia 

















Morocco, Mali, (Libya), Tunisia, Niger, Mauritania 
Zaire, Zambia, (Namibia), Congo 
Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger 
S.Africa, Zimbabwe, (Namibia) 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Zaire 
Nigeria, Chad, Central African Rep, Congo, Gabon 
Zaire, Chad, Sudan, Cameroon, Congo 
Sudan, Cent Afr Rep, Niger, Cameroon, (Libya), Nigeria 
Zaire, Gabon, Cameroon, Cent Afr Rep, Angola 
Sudan, Israel, (Libya) 
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya 
Congo, Cameroon 
Senegal 
Togo, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso 
Mali, Sierra Leonne, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, (Guinea-Bissau) 
Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan 
South Africa 
Guinea, Sierra Leonne, Ivory Coast 
Mauritius, Mozambique 
Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania 
Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina, Guinea, Niger, Ivory Coast, Senegal 
Mali, Senegal, Algeria, (W.Sahara) 
Madagascar 
Algeria, (W.Sahara) 
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, Swaziland 
Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, Mali, Burkina, Benin, (Libya) 
Cameroon, Niger, Benin, Chad 
Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda 
Mauritania, Gambia, Mali, Guinea, (Guinea-Bissau) 
Guinea, Liberia 
Ethiopia, Kenya, (Djibouti) 
Botswana, (Namibia), Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Ethiopia, Chad, Egypt, Central African Rep, Zaire, Uganda, (Libya), Kenya 
South Africa, Mozambique 
Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Burundi, Uganda, Zambia, Rwanda 
Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso 
Algeria, (Libya) 
Kenya, Zaire, Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda 
Angola, Congo, Zambia, Central African Rep, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda 
Zaire, Angola, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, (Namibia) 
Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, South Africa 
India, Burma 
Thailand, India, (Laos), Bangladesh, (China) 
(Taiwan), (China) 
Bangladesh, (China), Pakistan, Nepal, Burma,(Bhutan) 
Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, (USSR), (Afghanistan) 
Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria 
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50. Japan ISLAND 
51. Jordan 





57. Philippines ISLAND 
58. Saudi Arabia 
59. Singapore 
60. Sri Lanka ISLAND 
61. Syria 








70. Fed Rep Germany 
71. Greece 












84. United Kingdom 
85. Barbados ISLAND 
86. Canada 
87. Costa Rica 
88. Dominican Rep 








97. Trin & Toh ISLAND 
98. United States 
South Korea, (China) 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Iraq 
(North Korea), Japan 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, (Brunei) 
India, (China) 
India, Iran, (China), (Afghanistan) 
Indonesia, (Brunei), (Vietnam) 
Yemen, Jordan, Oman, United Arab Emir, Iraq, Kuwait, (Qatar) 
Malaysia 
India 
Turkey; Iraq, Jordan, Israel, (Lebanon) 
Hong Kong, (China) 
Malaysia, Burma, (Laos), (Cambodia) 
Fed Rep Germany, (Czechoslovakia), Italy, Switzerland, (Hungary), 
(Yugoslavia), (Liechtens) 
France, Netherlands, Fed Rep Germany, Luxembourg 
Turkey, Syria, (Lebanon) 
Fed Rep Germany 
Norway, Sweden, (USSR) 
Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Fed Rep Germany, Luxembourg, (Monaco) 
Austria, Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
(Czechslovakia) 
Turkey, (Bulgaria), (Albania), (Yugoslavia) 
Norway, United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
Switzerland, France, Austria, (Yugoslavia) 
Belgium, Fed Rep Germany, France 
Italy, Greece, (Libya), Egypt 
Fed Rep Germany, Belgium 




Italy, France, Fed Rep Germany, Austria 
Syria, (USSR), Iran, Iraq, (Bulgaria), Greece 
Ireland 





Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, (Belize) 
Dominican Republic 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala 
Haiti, (Cuba) 
United States, Guatemala, (Belize) 
Honduras, Costa Rica 
















111. Australia ISLAND 
112. Fiji ISLAND 
113. New Zealand ISLAND 
114. Papua New Guinea 




Chile, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay 
Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay 
Bolivia, Venezuela, ·Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, Suriname 
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru 
Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama 
Peru, Colombia 
Brazil, Venezuela, Suriname 
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia 
Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile 
Guyana, Brazil, (French Guinea) 
Brazil, Argentina 
Brazil, Colombia, Guyana 
New Zealand, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand 
Australia, Fiji 
Indonesia 
Mali, Niger, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen 
Saudi Arabia, Oman 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea 
Notes: Country ordering follows Barro and Wolf (1989). Data unavailable for countries in parentheses. 
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Appendix 2: Definitions of Variables 
""GR6085: average growth rate of per capita real GDP from 1960 to 1985. 
GDP60: value of real GDP per capita in 1960. 
SEC60: secondary school enrollment rate in 1960. 
PRIM60: primary school enrollment rate in 1960. 
POP60: population in millions in 1960. 
INV: average of the real ratio of real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GDP from 
1960 to 1985. 
GOVCONSMP: average of the ratio of real government consumption (exclusive of defense and 
education) to real GDP from 1960 to 1985. 
PPIDEV: magnitude of the deviation of the purchasing power parity value for the investment 
deflator (U.S. =100) in 1960 from the sample mean. 
REV: number of revolutions and coups per year (1960-1985 or subsample) 
REG REV: the average number of revolutions and coups per year (REV) in neighboring 
countries. 
MAX REG REV: (MIN, SUM) the maximum (minimum, sum) of REV over the sample of 
neighboring countries. 
AVG REG DEFENSE (MAX REG DEFENSE): the average (maximum) ratio of defense 
spending to GDP from 1960 to 1985 in neighboring countries. 
AFRICA: dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
LAT AMER: dummy variable for Latin America. 
LANDLOCK: dummy variable for landlocked countries. 
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